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Jacques R. Pauwels, The Myth of the Good War: America in the 
Second World War Revised Edition, 2nd ed. Toronto: James Lorimer 
& Company, 2015. Pp. 326.
American involvement in the Second World War has been questioned 
by left leaning writers, academics, and other individuals since the 
conflict began. Jacques R. Pauwels’ revised edition of The Myth of the 
Good War: America in the Second World War continues this tradition 
in a non-traditional manner. It challenges traditional perceptions 
of the United States government’s goals during the conflict while 
engaging with the established historiography. The objective of the 
book is twofold. First, Pauwels states that the primary factor in 
motivating the United States government during this period was 
private corporate profit rather than idealism and altruism as is 
normally presented when invoking the concept of the ‘good war’ (p. 
7). This includes examining decisions that affected the entrance of 
the United States into the war and its conduct before, during, and 
after the fighting had taken place. While Pauwels struggles with 
labels, this is a revisionist work. The second primary objective is to 
challenge how historical works are created and the audiences they 
are intended for. Traditional works, Pauwels argues, often only tell 
part of the story. He argues these types of works are inaccessible to 
the general reader (p. 11). Pauwels attempts to right this wrong by 
presenting an encompassing work on the reasons that led the United 
States to enter and become involved in the Second World War. 
Pauwels’ sources appear to form the support for his primary 
challenge to traditional historical scholarship. He rejects the use of 
primary sources and only employs secondary sources. This creates 
issues with his arguments, which I will return to later. In terms 
of the actual prose there are no noteworthy problems. The writing 
is accessible and clear throughout the work, which contributes 
well to the goal to reach a more general audience. However, his 
argumentation suffers from a lack of clarity at numerous points and 
leaps in logic negatively detract from the overall argument. When 
there is no evidence for one direction or another the author assumes 
the case supports his conclusions. For example, when discussing 
profits made during the war by enterprises with an American parent 
in occupied Europe, Pauwels states, we cannot be sure who reaped 
the profits. He seems to have assumed that these profits ended up 
in the bank accounts of American bankers, which supports his thesis 
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that American participation was motivated by financial gain (p. 235). 
This is one example of many present throughout the text. There 
are also a few historical mistakes made in the text that call into 
question the author’s attention to detail. The Allied landings in North 
Africa are said have to taken place in November 1941 in relation 
to diplomatic relations with Vichy, which is over a year before the 
United States actually entered the war (p. 54). Pauwels claims that 
the Red Army stopped pillaging after passing through East Prussia 
(p. 185). This is blatantly false as most works on the eastern front 
note this behaviour continued well into the Red Army’s advance into 
Germany.1 Mistakes such as these detract from the arguments made 
throughout the book, and one wonders what other mistakes may be 
present. Overall execution leaves much to be desired as the book is 
filled with editing and historical errors that detract from the author’s 
overall argument. 
Methodology is as much of a part of the argument as is the 
approach. Pauwels’ decision to use only secondary sources supports 
his attempt to introduce a revisionist view to a wider audience. This 
goal creates more problems than it solves. Relying only on secondary 
sources can be done if one’s goal is to understand changing perspectives 
on a topic. However, Pauwels’ use of secondary sources seems to be an 
attempt to argue about historical events and reach conclusions about 
the war and the events that shaped the Cold War. These arguments 
are not fully developed as the result of this methodology. One positive 
that does result from this approach is the wide geographic range of 
sources made available, such as works from the western European 
nations Italy, France, and Germany. Unfortunately, despite using 
a broad research base, the sources utilised do not add depth to 
the argument. The author claims that a wider geographic scope of 
sources will benefit our understanding of the American involvement 
in the war. While this effort is commendable, the sources used in the 
book do not provide differing perspective; they only confirm previous 
conclusions.
1 Gerhard Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 786; Antony 
Beevor, The Second World War (New York: Back Bay Book, 2012), 689; Max 
Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2004), 477. 
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Pauwels’ writing is disjointed at times and he makes connections 
between far ranging and unconnected events. This may be a reflection 
of his goal to reach a wide audience but the examples provided 
frequently require further explanation. Pauwels also writes off topic 
from his primary topic of American involvement in the Second World 
War. For instance, while analysing the war in Italy, Pauwels digresses 
to discussions of the drug underworld connection to the war against 
the Sandinistas and the sixteenth century political theory of cuius 
region eius religio (pp. 119, 121). Anecdotes such as this appear 
to be intended to help the reader, but they expand the evidence 
beyond the context of the thesis. Detours in the writing detract from 
the argument. Understanding Central America politics in the 1980s 
or European religious rule does not support the argument that the 
Second World War was not necessarily the ‘good war’.
The Myth of the Good War fits into the new left historiography 
on the Second World War that arose during the 1960s particularly 
in the United States. Pauwels relies heavily on scholars such as Gar 
Alperovitz, William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and Howard 
Zinn to frame his argument. His work is difficult to situate in the 
literature as, in my opinion, it does not add much to our existing 
understanding; the book technically offers no new information due 
to the sole use of secondary sources. This, however, does not prevent 
Pauwels from asserting bold claims, such as the Second World War 
was won with the Soviet victory in the battle of Moscow in 1941, or 
that the Allies were ready to invade northern France in 1942 (pp. 
9, 95). Pauwels continues the new left tradition of highlighting the 
supposed lack of Allied support, through avoiding combat with Nazi 
Germany, for the Soviet Union early in the war. This is coupled with 
the argument that the American and British high command and 
politicians wanted the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany to slaughter 
each other on the eastern front. Arguing that the invasion of Western 
Europe was postponed due to sinister ulterior motives is but one 
example of an argument being made with no proper documentation. 
This work may seem to add to our understanding of the conflict, 
but claims are made without any primary evidence and only tenuous 
support from secondary works. Primary documents, had they been 
used, would alleviate these concerns.
Pauwels’ work is not intended for an academic audience. His 
introduction makes this quite clear and, therefore, the book is not 
recommended for academic readers. Historical errors and leaps in logic 
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demonstrate that this work should not be used in a formal education 
setting. I do, however, recommend it for a general audience interested 
in a compilation of revisionist ideas on America’s involvement in the 
Second World War. I caution readers to think critically when moving 
through the text and to be mindful of the historical misinterpretations
brad st. croix, university of ottawa
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